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“Between” a Rock and a Hard Place:  
Martin Marietta v. Vulcan and the Rise of the 
Backdoor Standstill 
Sasha S. Hahn* 
A recent trend has created an anomaly in interpreting confidentiality agreements in the 
context of merger negotiations. After the Canadian decision in Certicom v. Research in 
Motion and the Delaware Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., standstill agreements may be 
read into standard confidentiality agreements without being separately negotiated or 
intended. These decisions have created the force of entire agreements out of the words 
“between” and “legally required.” This Note argues for a contextualist, rather than 
traditionalist, approach to interpreting these “backdoor” standstills to avoid unintended 
consequences for parties to these agreements.  
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014. Many thanks to Professor
Abraham Cable for his guidance in writing this Note, and to the editors of the Hastings Law Journal 
for their hard work and support. 
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Introduction 
A merger or acquisition is the most fundamental change for a 
corporation: it ends the existence of one corporation when it is absorbed 
by another.1 In contemplating a merger, firms must determine whether the 
decision to merge will result in higher future returns, the firm to be 
acquired is properly valued, and the merger will result in more efficiency.2 
In evaluating whether to pursue a merger, companies are required to 
exchange information that they may wish to keep confidential. Companies 
1. William A. Klein et al., Business Organization and Finance: Legal and Economic
Principles 222 (11th ed. 2010). 
2. William W. Bratton, Corporate Finance: Cases and Materials 766 (6th ed. 2007). 
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discussing a potential merger negotiate confidentiality agreements early 
on to protect misuse and unwanted disclosure of proprietary information. 
A company that wishes to avoid a hostile takeover attempt will usually 
separately negotiate a standstill provision to expressly preclude the other 
company from launching a hostile bid.3 
A recent Canadian decision, Certicom Corp. v. Research in Motion 
Ltd., and the Delaware Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme Court 
decisions in Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co. have 
promoted a method of sidestepping the need to negotiate an express 
standstill.4 These “backdoor” standstill agreements are established through 
an interpretation of the use and disclosure provisions of confidentiality 
agreements. Courts have also created these backdoor standstills through 
the remedies imposed for breach of confidentiality agreements. The 
recent direction of these courts—broadly interpreting certain 
confidentiality agreements to effectively create standstill agreements—
may generate crippling results.  
Competing theories of contractual interpretation produce varying 
results in this context. This Note argues that the recent trend toward 
adopting the traditionalist interpretation of confidentiality agreements is 
unfair to parties and shareholders and makes compliance with federal 
disclosure requirements difficult. Part I summarizes the background of 
confidentiality agreements in the context of mergers and acquisitions 
(“M&A”), as well as required federal securities disclosures. Part II 
discusses the two competing approaches to the interpretation of contracts. 
Part III explores the recent judicial trend in broadly interpreting 
confidentiality agreements, providing an in-depth analysis of the Certicom 
and Martin Marietta decisions and their potential ramifications. Part IV 
examines a hypothetical case under the two competing interpretive 
approaches, advocating for a contextualist approach in favor of honoring 
the intent of the parties. 
I.  Mergers and Acquisitions, Confidentiality, and Required 
Securities Disclosures 
A merger is a transaction in which one corporation purchases the 
assets and liabilities of another corporation in exchange for its own 
securities or cash, or a combination of both.5 A company entertaining 
acquisition offers is required to release certain information to enable the 
3. A “hostile” takeover bid is one that is opposed by incumbent management. A “friendly” bid
is supported by management. Klein et al., supra note 1, at 190. 
4. Certicom Corp. v. Research in Motion Ltd. (2009), 94 O.R. 3d 511 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.);
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co. (Martin Marietta I), 56 A.3d 1072 (Del Ch. 2012); 
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co. (Martin Marietta II), 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012). 
5. Klein et al., supra note 1, at 222.
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potential buyers to make their best offers.6 Confidentiality agreements 
protect this sensitive information from being misused.7 This Part provides 
background about the standard agreements made early in merger 
negotiations, as well as an overview of the disclosure requirements and 
confidential treatment under federal securities law. 
A. Confidentiality Agreements and Standstill Agreements 
Confidentiality agreements and standstill agreements are widely 
accepted practices in the M&A context. Confidentiality agreements 
protect confidential information that may be shared during the evaluation 
of a potential merger. Standstill agreements are separate agreements or 
provisions that preclude an unsolicited purchase from a buyer. 
1. Confidentiality Agreements
In the context of merger discussions, a confidentiality agreement is 
generally the very first agreement signed.8 A confidentiality agreement 
represents the dual interests of the parties in protecting confidential 
information shared in order to evaluate whether to proceed with a merger.9 
A confidentiality agreement normally covers the following issues: 
 the definition of the information that will be subject to the terms of
the agreement (usually stated very broadly as covering all 
information that is provided) and exceptions to the definition or to 
the confidentiality obligations imposed by the agreement (such as 
information that is already publicly available); 
 the obligation to preserve the confidentiality of the information
that is provided, together with provisions for enforcement of that 
obligation; 
 the obligation to limit use of the information to evaluation and
negotiation of a possible transaction; 
 a disclaimer of any obligation to negotiate or complete a
transaction; 
 an obligation to return or destroy the information that has been
provided (and related notes and analyses), to the extent the 
information is in tangible, electronic, or other retrievable form, if 
discussions are terminated; and 
 a disclaimer of any representation or warranty as to the accuracy or
completeness of the information that is being provided, deferring 
6. Aaron D. Rachelson, Corporate Acquisitions, Mergers & Divestitures § 1:29 (2013). 
7. Ugo Draetta, Precontractual Documents in Merger or Acquisition Negotiations: An Overview
of the International Practice, 16 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 45, 47 (1991). 
8. Am. Bar Ass’n, The 17th Annual National Institute on Negotiating Business
Acquisitions A-5 (2012). 
9. Id. 
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any such representations to a definitive acquisition agreement 
between the parties.10 
Because confidentiality agreements are entered into so early on in 
negotiations, they “typically do not describe in any detail the type of 
transaction that may result.”11 
2. Standstill Agreements
While confidentiality agreements “may prevent disclosure of 
confidential information, they do not, by themselves, preclude the bidder 
from using it for its own purposes.”12 Through a separately negotiated 
standstill agreement or provision, target companies in a merger context 
can preclude any unsolicited tender offers that might take advantage of 
such information.13 A standstill provision generally provides that a buyer 
will not try to buy the target on an unsolicited basis, buy its securities in 
the open market, or make an otherwise hostile offer to buy the target.14 It 
has been acknowledged that use restrictions in a standard confidentiality 
agreement do not provide enough protection, and lawyers prefer to 
negotiate separate standstill provisions that have specific durations.15 
B. Federal Securities Requirements Under the Williams Act 
Federal securities laws require certain disclosures for publicly traded 
companies. In the context of tender offers,16 the provisions enacted under 
the Williams Act establish affirmative disclosure requirements.17 This 
Subpart provides a brief overview of the Williams Act and its required 
disclosures. 
In 1968, the Williams Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 by adding provisions that required various disclosures, prohibited 
10. Am. Bar Ass’n Mergers & Acquisitions Comm., Model Stock Purchase Agreement with
Commentary 70 (2d ed. 2010). 
11. Id. at 71. 
12. William J. Carney, Mergers and Acquisitions: Cases and Materials 369 (2000). 
13. Id. 
14. Richard E. Climan et al., Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies in Transactions
Structured as Friendly Tender Offers, 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 615, 637 (2012). Although the legality of 
standstill agreements has been questioned as potentially illegal shareholder vote-selling or a breach of 
the management’s fiduciary duties to its shareholders, standstill agreements have generally been found 
to be enforceable. See Steven A. Baronoff, Note, The Standstill Agreement: A Case of Illegal Vote 
Selling and a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 93 Yale L.J. 1093, 1093 (1984); Brian K. Kidd, The Need For 
Stricter Scrutiny: Application of the Revlon Standard to the Use of Standstill Agreements, 24 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 2517, 2520–21 (2003). 
15. Climan et al., supra note 14, at 641–42 (“[I]f in fact there is no disagreement in principle as to
whether or not the prospective buyer can unilaterally go hostile, I don’t want there to be any doubt or 
question. . . . Many practitioners don’t focus on the use restriction with a standstill mindset.”). 
16. A “tender offer” is made by inviting shareholders to tender their shares to a representative of
the bidding corporation. Klein et al., supra note 1, at 189. 
17. Along with the protections of the Williams Act, a majority of the states have also adopted
antitakeover statutes. Id. at 206. 
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fraudulent conduct in connection with tender offers, and mandated 
provisions that must be a part of all tender offers.18 Congress, concerned 
about the pace of takeovers and the possibility that shareholders were 
coerced into tendering their shares,19 enacted the Williams Act to ensure 
full and fair disclosure to investors responding to tender offers, and to 
give shareholders the opportunity to examine the relevant facts to make 
a decision without pressure.20 The disclosure scheme and subsequent 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules provided under the 
Williams Act allow a target company’s shareholders the appropriate time 
and information to decide whether to tender their shares.21 These “line-
item” disclosure requirements adopted by the SEC “expressly call for the 
disclosure of negotiations.”22 Practitioners accept that these line items are 
deemed to be material and that omitting such information would be a 
violation of SEC rules.23 
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that a 
person who acquires five percent or more of another company’s voting 
equity securities disclose: 
[I]nformation as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings 
with any person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including 
but not limited to transfer of any of the securities . . . or the giving or 
withholding of proxies, naming the persons with whom such contracts, 
arrangements, or understandings have been entered into, and giving 
the details thereof.24 
Acquiring more than five percent of a company’s voting equity 
securities triggers the duty to file a Schedule 13D, which sets forth these 
disclosures as line items.25 Item 6 of Schedule 13D requires disclosure of 
“any contracts, arrangements, understandings, or relationships (legal or 
otherwise) among the persons named in Item 2 [the reporting person] 
and between such persons and any person with respect to any securities 
of the issuer.”26 
If a tender offer would result in beneficial ownership of more than 
five percent of the class of securities, section 14(d) requires that the offeror 
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)–(e), n(d)–(f) (2012). 
19. Klein et al., supra note 1, at 193. 
20. SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1985). 
21. Steven G. Sanders, Comment, Line-Item Disclosure Provisions and the Materiality of
Preliminary Merger Negotiations After In Re George C. Kern, Jr., 59 Brook. L. Rev. 175, 191 (1993). 
22. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Secrecy, the Federal Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of
Ongoing Negotiations, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 93, 103 (1986). 
23. Ronald J. Colombo, Effectuating Disclosure Under the Williams Act, 60 Cath. U. L. Rev. 311,
321 (2011). 
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(E) (2012). 
25. Arnold S. Jacobs, The Williams Act—Tender Offers and Stock Accumulations 99 (2011). 
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2013). 
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make certain additional filings.27 Similar to section 13(d), section 14(d)(1) 
requires line-item disclosures.28 Disclosures under section 14(d) are set 
forth in a Schedule 14D. Item 3(b) “requires disclosure of any ‘contacts, 
negotiations or transactions’ between the target and a bidder concerning 
a ‘merger, consolidation or acquisition; a tender offer or other acquisition 
of securities; an election of directors; or a sale or other transfer of a 
material amount of assets.’”29 Item 7 of Schedule 14D-1 requires 
disclosure of “any contract, arrangement, understanding or relationship 
(whether or not legally enforceable) between the bidder . . . and any 
person with respect to any securities of the [target] company.”30 A 
Schedule TO must also accompany a tender offer.31 Item 5 of Schedule 
TO requires disclosure of information required by Items 1005(a) and (b) 
of Regulation M-A.32 Regulation M-A, Item 1005(b) describes “significant 
corporate events” as: 
[A]ny negotiations, transactions or material contacts during the past 
two years between the filing person (including subsidiaries of the filing 
person and any person specified in Instruction C of the schedule) and 
the subject company or its affiliates concerning any: (1) Merger; 
(2) Consolidation; (3) Acquisition; (4) Tender offer for or other 
acquisition of any class of the subject company’s securities; (5) Election 
of the subject company’s directors; or (6) Sale or other transfer of a 
material amount of assets of the subject company.33 
Thus, Schedule TO requires tender offerors to disclose to the SEC 
negotiations and transactions concerning a merger. 
Exchange offers in which stock is to be issued require a Form S-4.34 
Item 6 requires the filer to describe any “material contracts, arrangements, 
understandings, relationships, negotiations, or transactions,” past or 
present, “between the company being acquired or its affiliates and the 
registrant or its affiliates, such as those concerning: a merger, consolidation 
or acquisition; a tender offer or other acquisition of securities; an election 
of directors; or a sale or other transfer of a material amount of assets.”35 
SEC rules contain certain processes for treating material filed with 
the SEC as confidential. However, each of these processes require that 
the filer file confidential material separately with the SEC and provide 
an application making any objection to the disclosure of the confidential 
27. Larry D. Soderquist & Theresa A. Gabaldon, Securities Law 142 (2011); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d) (2012). 
28. Jacobs, supra note 25, at 111–12. 
29. Brown, supra note 22, at 103 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1986)). 
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. § 229.1005. 
34. Id. § 239.25; U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC 2077 (12-08), Form S-4, Registration Statement
Under the Securities Act of 1933 (2008). 
35. Id. at Item 6. 
1400 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1393 
portion, and stating the grounds of such objection.36 The grounds for 
objection and exemption include “trade secrets and commercial or 
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential,” which encompasses “[i]nformation contained in reports, 
summaries, analyses, letters, or memoranda arising out of, in anticipation 
of or in connection with an examination or inspection of the books and 
records of any person or any other investigation.”37 
For public companies, federal securities laws require many disclosures 
in connection with tender offers. These requirements create conflict when 
weighed against the requirements drawn by confidentiality agreements 
between two parties to a merger negotiation. 
II. Interpretation of Contracts: Traditionalist vs. Contextualist
For parties in a contractual dispute, the court’s interpretation of the 
contract terms is paramount. This Part will provide an overview of the 
different judicial approaches to contract interpretation, which this Note 
will return to in Part IV, which discusses the implications of using these 
methods of interpretation on language that may create “backdoor” 
standstill agreements. 
Courts differ in their approaches to contract interpretation and 
generally fall into one of two camps: the traditionalist38 Willistonian39 
approach, or the contextualist40 Corbinian41 approach.42 These competing 
approaches differ in their use of extrinsic evidence—or information not 
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.24(b)-(2) (requiring filing of confidential material separately with the SEC,
along with an application making objection to the disclosure of the confidential portion); id. § 230.406 
(requiring separate filing of the confidential portion with the SEC and application making objection to 
disclosure); id. § 200.83 (allowing persons submitting information to request that it be withheld when 
requested under the Freedom of Information Act). Rule 83 is a catchall provision that only applies if 
no other statute or rule “provides procedures for requesting confidential treatment respecting 
particular categories of information.” Id. § 200.83. Under Rule 83, the person submitting information 
must mark the confidential pages with “Confidential Treatment Requested by [name]” along with a 
“written request for confidential treatment which specifies the information as to which confidential 
treatment is requested.” Id. 
37. Id. § 200.80. 
38. The Willistonian approach assumes that contracts have “plain meanings” that are apparent to
the interpreter. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 Yale L.J. 541, 572 (2003). 
39. Samuel Williston, arguably the most widely known contracts scholar, was a formalist and the
author of the treatise Williston on Contracts. See generally Samuel Williston, Williston on 
Contracts (1920). 
40. The contextualist approach allows courts to consider all material evidence in resolving
interpretive issues. Thus, the main difference in the two approaches is the size of the evidentiary base 
upon which the court bases its determination. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 38, at 572–73. 
41. Arthur Corbin was a proponent of the philosophy of legal realism and the author of the
treatise Corbin on Contracts. See generally Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts (1952).  
42. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism
Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 Ky. L.J. 43, 55 (2008). 
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embodied in the written agreement—in contract interpretation. Many 
state courts, including Delaware, use the traditionalist “four corners” 
rule to determine whether extrinsic evidence should be admitted in 
interpretation.43 Although “the role of a court is to effectuate the parties’ 
intent” in interpreting a contract, courts using the traditionalist approach 
are “constrained by a combination of the parties’ words and the plain 
meaning of those words.”44 Under the traditionalist approach, the court 
may consider evidence outside of the plain meaning of the contract 
language only if the language is ambiguous.45 Ambiguity exists if the 
terms are fairly susceptible to different interpretations or may have two 
or more different meanings.46 For courts using this approach, “[t]he true 
test is not what the parties to the contract intended it to mean, but what a 
reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it 
meant.”47 The rationale for this approach is that the plain language 
should control if the meaning is clear because “creating an ambiguity 
where none exists could, in effect, create a new contract with rights, 
liabilities and duties to which the parties had not assented.”48 If the court 
finds ambiguity, it will look beyond the terms of the contract and may 
consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties.49 
A minority of states, including California, use the contextualist 
approach, which interprets contractual meaning in light of all the 
circumstances that help explain the context in which the drafter used the 
words in a contract.50 The rationale for this approach is that “[t]he 
exclusion of parol evidence regarding such circumstances merely because 
the words do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily lead to the 
attribution to a written instrument of a meaning that was never 
intended.”51 Extrinsic evidence exposes latent ambiguities that may exist 
even if language appears unambiguous to a judge.52 Thus, extrinsic 
evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract if the 
evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language is 
reasonably susceptible.53 The purpose of this approach is to uphold the 
intent of the parties.54 
43. Riverbend Cmty., LLC v. Green Stone Eng’g, LLC, 55 A.3d 330, 334 (Del. 2012). 
44. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 739 (Del. 2006). 
45. Id. 
46. Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702 A.2d 1228, 1232 (Del. 1997). 
47. Lorillard, 903 A.2d at 739 (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins.
Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Del. 1992)). 
48. Id. 
49. GMG Capital Invs., LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 780 (Del. 2012). 
50. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968). 
51. Id. 
52. Wolf v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 655–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
53. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 442 P.2d at 644. 
54. Id. (“In this state, however, the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract is the
source of contractual rights and duties.”); Cal. Civ. Code § 1636 (West 2014) (“A contract must be so 
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The methodology the court uses to interpret a contract can elicit 
very different outcomes from the same facts. Below, Part IV examines a 
set of facts under both approaches, advocating for a contextualist 
approach in interpreting confidentiality agreements with potential 
“backdoor” standstills. Interpreting terms of a confidentiality agreement 
to create the effect of a standstill agreement is unfair and confusing to 
the drafters of such contracts. 
III. Recent Court Decisions Creating Backdoor Standstills
Recent court decisions in Canada and the United States have created 
troublesome precedent in interpreting confidentiality agreements. In 
Certicom Corp. v. Research in Motion Ltd.,55 a Canadian court interpreted 
the word “between” to create an effective standstill agreement out of the 
terms of a nondisclosure agreement. The Delaware Court of Chancery 
and Delaware Supreme Court followed suit in Martin Marietta Materials, 
Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., and issued an injunction preventing a hostile 
bid as the remedy for breach of two confidentiality agreements.56 This 
Part summarizes these cases and discusses the repercussions of the 
analysis and remedies provided by these courts. 
A. CERTICOM V. RESEARCH IN MOTION (Canada) 
The 2009 Canadian decision in Certicom set recent precedent for 
American courts dealing with terms of confidentiality agreements.57 In 
Certicom, the parties’ use of the word “between” in certain confidentiality 
agreements operated to block the unsolicited takeover bid of one party for 
the other.58 The court used its plain language interpretation of “between” 
to find an effective standstill in a provision of the confidentiality 
agreement, even though there was a separately negotiated standstill 
provision that had a shorter term.59 
The nondisclosure agreements (“NDAs”) between Certicom and 
Research in Motion (“RIM”) defined the purpose for which use of the 
confidential information was permitted to mean “assessing the desirability 
or viability of establishing or furthering a business or contractual 
relationship between the Parties which may include, without limitation, 
some form of business combination between the Parties.”60 At issue for 
the Canadian court was “whether a hostile take-over bid is some form of 
interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of 
contracting.”). 
55. (2009), 94 O.R. 3d 511, para. 59 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
56. 56 A.3d 1072 (Del Ch. 2012), aff’d 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012). 
57. See generally Certicom, 94 O.R. 3d 511. 
58. Id. at para. 97. 
59. Id. at para. 53. 
60. Id. at para. 13. 
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a business combination between the parties and therefore whether the 
Confidential Information could be used for the purpose of assessing the 
desirability of a hostile bid.”61 The NDA in question contained a separate 
standstill agreement with an expiration date.62 After the standstill period 
expired, RIM launched its hostile bid for Certicom.63 Certicom claimed 
that RIM’s use of confidential information in evaluating its hostile bid 
breached the terms of the NDA regarding confidentiality and sought a 
permanent injunction to prevent RIM from advancing its bid.64 
 The court, accepting that “a takeover bid can constitute a business 
combination” as required by the NDA, nonetheless held that “a takeover 
bid is not necessarily a business combination between the parties.”65 The 
court used the dictionary definition of “between” and decided that it 
meant that the relationship between Certicom and RIM was contractual, 
and thus a takeover bid would only amount to “a business combination 
between the parties” if Certicom agreed to RIM’s bid.66 The court 
explained: 
Thus, a confidentiality provision can independently prohibit the use of 
the information disclosed for the purpose of assessing the desirability 
of a hostile bid and thereby hamper the ability of the ‘disclosee’ to 
make an unsolicited bid. A standstill provision is better protection, 
removing the need for proof, and costly litigation.67 
Thus the court admitted that its interpretation of the contract created an 
effective standstill despite the fact that a standstill provision was 
separately drafted. 
The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting RIM from 
“taking any steps to advance the hostile takeover bid.”68 It also noted 
that RIM was “free to make a friendly bid, and, should it manage to craft 
a manner of launching a subsequent hostile bid without breaching the 
non-disclosure agreements, as Certicom submits it is possible to do, 
another hostile bid.”69 
The court itself expressed skepticism as to whether it would be 
possible for RIM to launch a hostile bid without breaching the NDA, but 
nonetheless left a subsequent hostile bid as a possibility. Regardless, 
through its remedy of injunction, the court effectively enforced the NDA 
as a standstill agreement despite the fact that a separate standstill 
provision already existed. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at para. 15. 
63. Id. at para. 36. 
64. Id. at para. 2. 
65. Id. at para. 48, 50 (emphasis added). 
66. Id. at para. 52–53 (emphasis added). 
67. Id. at para. 56. 
68. Id. at para. 97. 
69. Id. 
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B. The MARTIN MARIETTA Decisions 
The recent Delaware Court of Chancery70 and Delaware Supreme 
Court71 decisions in Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials 
Co. exemplify the difficulties facing the courts in deciding contractual 
disputes involving confidentiality agreements. The dispute involved two 
rivals considering a merger, but behind the negotiations lay power 
struggles and intra-corporate politics. The history of negotiations 
between the two companies and the terms of the agreements that they 
signed are informative as to the ultimate outcome of the case in both the 
Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court. 
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. (“Martin Marietta”) and Vulcan 
Materials Co. (“Vulcan”) are the two largest construction aggregate 
companies in the United States.72 Over the past decade, Martin Marietta 
and Vulcan periodically discussed the possibility of a merger, but no 
significant progress was made until 2010.73 In 2010, Martin Marietta’s 
newly appointed CEO, Ward Nye, and Vulcan’s longtime CEO, Don 
James, rekindled friendly merger talks.74 Originally, Vulcan was seen as 
the natural acquirer, and Nye was concerned with confidentiality because 
he was interested in keeping his new CEO position and did not want 
Martin Marietta to be subject to a hostile takeover by Vulcan or another 
company.75 Nye’s motivations in seeking a deal and keeping 
confidentiality were driven by entrenchment: 
Critically for Nye personally, Nye perceived . . . that the timing was 
right for a combination whereby Nye would end up as CEO. . . . Nye 
felt that this was a good moment to engage but if, and only if, he could 
get assurances to calm his nerves about the possibility that leaked 
discussions would end up putting Martin Marietta in play.76 
The two CEOs agreed to keep their discussions completely 
confidential in order to prevent any potential leaks that might trigger 
unsolicited activity from other companies.77 The companies memorialized 
this agreement in the two confidentiality agreements at issue, the NDA, 
and the Joint Defense Agreement (“JDA”).78 
The NDA—which had a term of two years, ending on May 3, 2012—
governed the exchange and treatment of evaluation material.79 The 
definition of “evaluation material” included non-public information 
70. Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072 (Del Ch. 2012). 
71. Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012). 
72. Id. at 1210. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 1210–11. 
76. Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072, 1081 (Del Ch. 2012). 
77. Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d at 1211. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
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disclosed, all analyses based upon that information, and the fact that the 
parties were discussing a transaction.80 The NDA was drafted by Martin 
Marietta’s general counsel, relying on a form from a previous agreement 
between the parties.81 Martin Marietta’s general counsel made “unilateral” 
changes to the form that made the NDA stronger by enlarging the scope 
of the information subject to the NDA’s restrictions and limiting the 
permissible uses and disclosures of the information covered by the 
NDA.82 The parties limited the application of the evaluation material for 
the sole “purpose of evaluating a Transaction,” which was defined as “a 
possible business combination transaction between Martin Marietta and 
Vulcan or one of their respective subsidiaries.”83 
The NDA also provided in Paragraph 3 that: 
Subject to paragraph (4), each party agrees that, without the prior 
written consent of the other party, it . . . will not disclose to any other 
person, other than as legally required, the fact that any Evaluation 
Material has been made available hereunder, that discussions or 
negotiations have or are taking place concerning a Transaction or any 
of the terms, conditions or other facts with respect thereto.84 
Paragraph 4 established a notice and vetting process for 
circumstances in which a party was required to disclose confidential 
material. This process was described in a section entitled “Required 
Disclosure,” which defined “required” to mean by an external demand —
“by oral questions, interrogatories, requests for information or documents 
in legal proceedings, subpoena, civil investigative demand or similar 
process.”85 
The second confidentiality agreement, the JDA, had an indefinite 
term and governed information sharing in facilitation of a joint analysis 
of the antitrust implications of the potential merger.86 The JDA defined 
“‘Transaction’ as ‘a potential transaction being discussed by Vulcan and 
Martin[] . . . involving the combination or acquisition of all or certain of 
their assets or stock.”87 The JDA limited use of confidential materials to 
“solely for purposes of pursuing and completing the Transaction.”88 
Though neither party discussed including a standstill provision in either 
the NDA or the JDA, the agreements were made in the context of 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072, 1082 (Del Ch. 2012) 
83. Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d at 1211–12 (emphasis added). 
84. Id. at 1212. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 1213. 
87. Id. (alterations in original). 
88. Id. 
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friendly merger negotiations, and Nye stressed the importance of the fact 
that Martin Marietta was not for sale.89 
In spring 2011, Vulcan’s stock value declined in comparison to Martin 
Marietta’s.90 Martin Marietta, originally the target of acquisition, began to 
consider acquiring Vulcan at a premium.91 After using confidential 
material disclosed by Vulcan in its deliberations, Martin Marietta 
launched an unsolicited exchange offer to purchase all of Vulcan’s 
outstanding shares, as well as a proxy contest, announced by a public 
bear hug letter in December 2011.92 Martin Marietta filed an S-4 and 
proxy statement with the SEC in connection with the exchange offer and 
proxy contest, discussing the history of its negotiations with Vulcan and 
other confidential information in the filings.93 Martin Marietta also 
disclosed confidential material for public relations uses in investor calls 
and presentations.94 
On the same day that it launched its hostile takeover bid, Martin 
Marietta brought suit in the Court of Chancery to obtain a declaration 
that the confidentiality agreements did not bar the exchange offer or 
proxy contest.95 Vulcan filed counterclaims seeking a finding that Martin 
Marietta breached the confidentiality agreements and an injunction from 
proceeding with the hostile bid.96 
1. Delaware Court of Chancery Decision
The Delaware Court of Chancery held that Martin Marietta breached 
both the NDA and the JDA by using and disclosing confidential material 
that was protected by the agreements.97 Vulcan advanced four arguments 
to prove that Martin Marietta breached the confidentiality agreements: 
(1) the confidentiality agreements precluded Martin Marietta from using 
evaluation material to pursue a hostile bid because the agreements 
limited the use of such information to a transaction that was the product 
of a voluntary contractual decision between the governing boards; 
(2) “even if Martin Marietta was free to use the Evaluation Material to 
consider [its hostile offer], it was not permitted to disclose that 
information or the fact” that the discussions had taken place because the 
89. Id. at 1211. 
90. Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072, 1093 (Del Ch. 2012) 
91. Id. 
92. Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d at 1214–15. A bear hug letter is a preliminary offer letter from a
bidder to acquire a target, which carries an implicit threat to deal directly with the stockholders in a 
hostile takeover if the target does not negotiate. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Art of Giving a Bear 
Hug, N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/05/technology/05sorkin.html?_r=1& 
93. Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d at 1215–16. 
94. Id. at 1216. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072, 1076 (Del Ch. 2012) 
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exception for “‘legally required’ disclosures only applied when a party 
received an External Demand;” (3) “even if Martin Marietta was legally 
required . . . to disclose [the] information by SEC Rules, [its tactical 
disclosures] went well beyond any legal requirement;” and (4) Martin 
Marietta’s disclosure of information to the public beyond the SEC filings 
was not legally required.98 
The court approached these claims in turn, first determining 
whether the terms of the agreements were ambiguous, and then turning 
to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent.99 In interpreting the 
NDA to determine whether Martin Marietta was allowed to use 
evaluation material to undertake a hostile bid, the court examined 
whether the terms “business combination transaction” and “between” 
were unambiguous.100 The court determined that “business combination 
transaction” was subject to multiple interpretations and could not 
conclude based on the text alone whether the term could encompass 
Martin Marietta’s exchange offer and proxy contest. The court then 
examined the word “between,” and found both Vulcan’s and Martin 
Marietta’s readings to be plausible.101 The court discussed the Certicom 
decision, but nonetheless stated that “between” was not a safe way for 
parties to limit usage of information to a negotiated transaction.102 
After concluding that the plain text of the NDA did not 
unambiguously support one reading and that the readings advanced by 
both parties were reasonable, the court turned to extrinsic evidence.103 
The extrinsic evidence showed (1) that Martin Marietta’s counsel drafted 
the agreement to strengthen the protections, (2) Nye did not want to put 
Martin Marietta in play and emphasized that it was “not for sale,” and 
(3) Martin Marietta deliberately concealed its use of the evaluation 
material in the months leading up to the hostile bid.104 These factors 
supported Vulcan’s reading that “business combination transaction 
between” only meant a consensual, contractually agreed upon merger of 
the companies.105 Thus, the “between the parties” language in the 
confidentiality agreements barred both parties from using the confidential 
information in consideration of anything but a contractually negotiated, 
consensual merger deal.106 The court held that the exchange offer and 
proxy contest both failed this definition of transaction, and therefore that 
98. Id. at 1103. 
99. Id. at 1105–06. 
100. Id. at 1105. 
101. Id. at 1115. 
102. Id. at 1117. 
103. Id. at 1117. 
104. Id. at 1118–19. 
105. Id. at 1121. 
106. Id. 
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Martin Marietta breached the use restrictions of the NDA.107 Because the 
terms of the JDA defined “transaction” as “a potential transaction being 
discussed by Vulcan and Martin Marietta,” the court concluded without 
looking to extrinsic evidence that Martin Marietta separately breached 
the JDA in preparing its hostile bid because the only transaction “being 
discussed” by the parties was a negotiated one.108 
The court then examined the term “legally required” to determine 
whether Martin Marietta was contractually entitled to disclose confidential 
information in its SEC filings.109 The court found that both parties’ 
readings were reasonable, although Martin Marietta’s reading was 
subject to some “strain.”110 In looking to the extrinsic evidence, the court 
held that the drafting history made clear that the definition of “legally 
required” was meant to be restrictive.111 The extrinsic evidence cited by 
the court included the fact that Martin Marietta’s counsel purposely drew 
a link between the “Required Disclosures” subject to the notice and 
vetting process and the term “legally required” in the next paragraph,112 
and that Martin Marietta’s own CEO expressed his intent to prevent 
Vulcan from pursuing a hostile bid.113 Thus, the court found that the 
exception for “legally required” disclosure meant in response to an 
external demand (such as a subpoena) in accordance with the notice and 
vetting process, and not in response to a discretionary action triggering a 
disclosure obligation.114 Because the terms of the NDA limited the 
definition of “legally required,” Martin Marietta breached the NDA 
when it disclosed information to the SEC in its S-4.115 
The court explained: 
[E]ven where a confidentiality agreement does not contain an express 
standstill provision, transactional lawyers are advised that restricting 
the scope of legally required disclosures to those that arise in the 
context of some sort of discovery obligation or affirmative legal 
process may have the effect of creating a backdoor standstill restriction if 
what is subject to that restricted definition is Transaction 
Information . . . that would need to be disclosed under Regulation M-A 
in the event that one of the parties to the agreement sought to pursue 
an unsolicited offer for the other.116 
Martin Marietta breached its non-disclosure obligations under the 
NDA because it did not disclose negotiating history in response to an 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 1122. 
110. Id. at 1126. 
111. Id. at 1128. 
112. Id. at 1129. 
113. Id. at 1131. 
114. Id. at 1134. 
115. Id. at 1135. 
116. Id. at 1135 (emphasis added). 
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external demand.117 The court explained that, even if the disclosures were 
legally required, Martin Marietta failed to abide by the notice and vetting 
process, thus breaching its procedural obligations under the NDA.118 
Furthermore, even if it were permitted to disclose the information to the 
SEC, Martin Marietta over-disclosed and provided a one-sided, 
opinionated account of the negotiations in its filings, and further 
disclosed the information to investors and the media, far exceeding any 
hypothetical legal requirement.119 
The court enjoined Martin Marietta from pursuing its hostile bid for 
four months, which precluded Martin Marietta from running its slate of 
directors for election at Vulcan’s annual meeting on June 1, 2012.120 
Because the parties had agreed in the NDA that money damages would 
be an insufficient remedy for a breach by any party, and that the non-
breaching party would be entitled to equitable relief, including 
injunction,121 the court held that this stipulation was sufficient to 
demonstrate irreparable harm.122 Furthermore, because “Vulcan [was] 
now suffering from exactly the same kind of harm Nye demanded the 
Confidentiality Agreements shield Martin Marietta from,” namely, “an 
unsolicited acquisition offer in a down market when it was not a good 
time to sell,” the court determined that irreparable harm was 
established.123 The court determined that the four-month injunction 
period was “a responsible period” referenced by the time between the 
date Martin Marietta launched the exchange offer and the expiration 
date of the NDA. Thus, Vulcan “simply [sought] the minimum period of 
repose during which its Evaluation Material and the Transaction 
Information could not be used against it to forcibly effect a transaction.”124 
The Court of Chancery, employing a traditionalist approach to 
contractual interpretation, determined that the confidentiality agreements 
were ambiguous, and therefore looked to extrinsic evidence to interpret 
that the parties intended the agreements to prevent the other party from 
using confidential information other than for a negotiated deal. This 




119. Id. at 1137. 
120. Id. at 1147. This effectively delayed Martin Marietta from running its slate of directors until 
the next Vulcan meeting in June 2013, putting a halt to the hostile takeover attempt for over a year. 
Martin Marietta has not since attempted another hostile bid. Martin Marietta to Explore Friendly Offer 
for Vulcan—WSJ, Reuters (Dec. 3, 2012, 1:29 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/03/ 
martinmarietta-offer-idUSL4N09D1T520121203. 
121. Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d at 1144. 
122. Id. at 1145. 
123. Id. at 1146. 
124. Id. at 1147. 
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2. The Delaware Supreme Court Upheld the Court of Chancery
Decision
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s 
judgments.125 As a preliminary matter, the court addressed Martin 
Marietta’s assertion that the Court of Chancery converted the 
confidentiality agreements into a standstill agreement.126 The court 
explained that confidentiality agreements typically do not prevent a 
party from making a hostile bid, and that confidentiality agreements are 
intended to protect non-public information, not a company’s corporate 
control or ownership.127 “It is undisputed,” the court continued, “that the 
Confidentiality Agreements in this case were true confidentiality 
agreements, not standstill agreements. They did not categorically 
preclude Martin from making a hostile takeover bid for Vulcan. What 
they did was preclude Martin from using and disclosing Vulcan’s 
confidential, nonpublic information except insofar as the agreements 
themselves permitted.”128 
The Court concluded that the Chancery Court was correct in 
holding: 
(i) [T]he JDA prohibited Martin from using and disclosing Vulcan 
Confidential Materials to conduct its hostile bid; (ii) the NDA 
prohibited Martin from disclosing Vulcan Evaluation Material without 
affording Vulcan pre-disclosure notice and without engaging in a 
vetting process; (iii) Martin breached the use and disclosure 
restrictions of the JDA and the disclosure restrictions of the NDA; and 
(iv) injunctive relief in the form granted was the appropriate remedy 
for those adjudicated contractual violations.129 
Because it affirmed the judgments on these grounds, the court did 
not address the Chancery Court’s other bases for contractual violations, 
including Martin Marietta’s breach of the use provisions of the NDA by 
using confidential material in deciding whether to launch its hostile bid 
because it was not a negotiated transaction “between” the parties.130 In 
declining to address this issue, the Delaware Supreme Court missed an 
opportunity to resolve the question of whether “between” unequivocally 
indicates a negotiated deal, as the Canadian court in Certicom decided, 
or whether the Court of Chancery’s determination that it may be subject 
to ambiguity was correct. 
In reviewing the Chancery Court’s determination that Martin 
Marietta violated the disclosure restrictions of the NDA, the court 
125. Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d 1208, 1210 (Del. 2012). 
126. Id. at 1218–19. 
127. Id. at 1219. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 1218. 
130. Id. 
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declined to reach the merits of the factual, ambiguity-based analysis, and 
instead made several conclusions based on the NDA’s “unambiguous” 
terms as a matter of law.131 Thus, the court did not look to any extrinsic 
evidence to interpret the contract. 
First, the court concluded that Paragraph 3, which provided the 
exception for legally required disclosures, did not authorize disclosure of 
evaluation material even if otherwise “legally required.”132 The court 
explained: “Evaluation Material does not fall with Paragraph 3’s ‘legally 
required’ carve-out exception, because that exception can only apply to 
the confidential information specifically identified in Paragraph 3.”133 
Second, the court found that Paragraph 4134 was the only provision that 
authorized disclosure of evaluation material, and only in response to an 
external demand and after complying with the notice and vetting 
process.135 Finally, the court concluded that Martin Marietta violated the 
use restrictions of the NDA because no external demand was made and 
Martin Marietta did not follow the notice and vetting process prior to 
making its disclosures.136 
In upholding the injunctive remedy, the court regarded the parties’ 
stipulation in the NDA that “money damages would not be [a] sufficient 
remedy for any breach” as a stipulation to irreparable injury.137 The court 
accepted the Chancery Court’s balancing of Vulcan’s need to vindicate 
its “reasonable [contractual] expectations” against the delay imposed on 
Martin Marietta.138 In upholding the Chancery Court’s remedy, the 
Delaware Supreme Court enforced a “backdoor” standstill agreement139 
while declining to use an ambiguity-based analysis. 
C. Reading Standstills into Standard Confidentiality Agreements 
The effect of these decisions has been to enforce confidentiality 
agreements as standstills, creating a dissonance between how early M&A 
agreements are drafted and how they are enforced. The Certicom and 
Martin Marietta decisions demonstrate how broad judicial interpretation 
and enforcement of confidentiality agreements creates backdoor standstill 
agreements. This Subpart examines the implications of these decisions and 
the difficulties they present. 
131. Id. at 1223. 
132. Id. at 1223–24. 
133. Id. at 1224. 
134. Paragraph 4 established the notice and vetting process for “Required Disclosures.” Id. at 1212. 
135. Id. at 1224–26. 
136. Id. at 1226. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 1227 (alterations in original). 
139. See Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072, 1135 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
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1. Implications of the Martin Marietta Decisions
The Martin Marietta courts’ injunction of the hostile bid as the 
remedy for breach effectively enforced a standstill agreement, not a 
confidentiality agreement. The parties did agree that money damages 
would not be a sufficient remedy for a breach, but an injunction on a 
hostile bid is not the remedy for breach of a duty not to disclose 
confidential information.140 A proper remedy for a breach of duty not to 
disclose would be an injunctive order to cease disclosure and refrain 
from further disclosing the confidential information.141 Instead, these 
courts have issued an injunction against a breach of a duty to not make a 
hostile bid, something the Delaware Supreme Court explicitly stated it 
did not do.142 Although the Delaware Supreme Court claimed that 
interpreting the NDA and JDA in this way did not create a standstill, in 
practice there is no way that Martin Marietta would have been able to 
pursue the hostile bid while still conforming to SEC disclosure 
requirements.143 
The Delaware Supreme Court, in declining to discuss whether the 
“between” language of the NDA prohibited Martin Marietta from using 
confidential information in contemplation of its hostile bid, ignored an 
opportunity to either reject or endorse the Chancery Court’s acceptance 
of the definition of “between” meaning only a negotiated, consensual 
deal.144 In doing so, the Delaware Supreme Court left this issue unresolved, 
leaving practitioners to wonder whether future Delaware courts will 
determine that “between” unequivocally indicates a negotiated deal, as in 
Certicom, or whether it may be subject to ambiguity, as the Court of 
Chancery determined.145 
2. Difficulties with this Approach
This recent trend of broad interpretation of the powers of 
confidentiality agreements may create results that are unfair to parties and 
 140. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357 (“[A]n injunction against breach of a contract 
duty will be granted in the discretion of the court against a party who has committed or is threatening 
to commit a breach of the duty if (a) the duty is one of forbearance.” (emphasis added)). 
 141. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357 cmt. b (“[T]he performance due under the 
contract consists simply of forbearance, and the injunction in effect orders specific performance.”). 
 142. See Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d at 1214, 1219 (“It is undisputed that the Confidentiality 
Agreements in this case were true confidentiality agreements, not standstill agreements. They did not 
categorically preclude Martin from making a hostile takeover bid for Vulcan.”). 
 143. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 239.25 (2013) (requiring disclosure of “any past, present or proposed 
material contracts, arrangements, understandings, relationships, negotiations or transactions” via 
Form S-4, Item 6); id. § 229.1005 (requiring disclosure of any “negotiations, transactions or material 
contacts”). The Certicom court, though skeptical of the feasibility of such action, still allowed in its 
remedy the potential to launch a subsequent hostile bid without breaching the agreements. Certicom 
Corp. v. Research in Motion Ltd. (2009), 94 O.R. 3d 511, at para. 97 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).  
144. See Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d at 1223. 
145. See Certicom, O.R. 3d 511 at para. 53; Martin Marietta I, 56 A.3d 1072, 1117 (Del Ch. 2012). 
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their shareholders. Confidentiality agreements are often the first 
agreements negotiated in preliminary dealings between parties.146 Broad 
readings of these early agreements prevent future action that was not 
contemplated by the parties and may create separate agreements that 
were or were not separately contemplated.147 By reading standstill 
agreements into standard confidentiality agreements, companies are 
prevented from seeking a noncontractual merger, even if that was not 
their intention in drafting. 
Standstill agreements are generally separately negotiated to have a 
specific term.148 The current trend in judicial interpretation enforces a 
backdoor standstill provision from standard NDAs with no separate 
expiration date. In Certicom, for example, where the parties negotiated a 
separate standstill, the court created another permanent standstill 
through the remedy it imposed for the breach of the confidentiality 
agreements.149 Thus, Certicom received the benefit of a permanent 
standstill agreement after its negotiated standstill period had expired. 
 Standstills mostly protect the incumbent management to the 
detriment of shareholders who would have had an opportunity to review 
the facts under the Williams Act disclosure requirements.150 Hostile 
tender offers make up only a small percentage of all tender offers, and 
tender offers comprise an even smaller percentage of all acquisitions.151 
Thus, the broad, board-protecting interpretation of confidentiality 
agreements is unwarranted. These court decisions have allowed the 
terms of standard confidentiality agreements to take over territory that is 
generally occupied by separately negotiated standstill agreements. This 
146. Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 8, at 4. 
 147. Reading confidentiality agreements broadly has ramifications outside of the context of 
preventing hostile takeovers. In Goodrich Capital, LLC v. Vector Capital Corporation, the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York did not dismiss a breach of contract claim based 
on an alleged violation of a confidentiality agreement’s use restriction. No. 11-9247, 2012 WL 4123401, 
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2012). Goodrich, the target, alleged that Vector, a potential buyer, used 
information provided by Goodrich to evaluate a different target in the same industry. Id. at *3 
Because Goodrich had provided Vector with the name of Vector’s ultimate target, the court allowed 
Goodrich’s claim for breach of the use restriction to survive Vector’s motion to dismiss. Id. Though 
only at the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) stage, this ruling indicates the judicial attitude 
toward broad interpretation of confidentiality agreements. If Goodrich’s claims succeed, the result 
would be that potential buyers, as a party to a confidentiality agreement with a potential target, could 
be restricted from pursuing an unrelated transaction with a different target in the same industry. See 
Hendrik F. Jordan et al., Confidentiality Agreements Matter—Three Recent Cases Impacting Private 
Equity Transactions, Morrison & Foerster LLP (2012), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/ 
120716-Confidentiality-Agreements.pdf. 
148. Climan et al., supra note 14, at 637. 
149. See Certicom, 94 O.R. 3d 511, at para. 97. 
150. See Klein et al., supra note 1, at 202–03 (discussing the use of defensive tactics raising 
suspicion that incumbent managers are trying to save their jobs rather than serve the shareholders to 
whom they owe a fiduciary duty). 
151. Id. at 197. 
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may result in difficulties for drafters of confidentiality agreements, 
including the increased need for lawyers to spend time on these early 
negotiations.152 
IV. The Traditionalist vs. Contextualist Interpretation of
“Backdoor Standstills” 
This Part examines a hypothetical situation, altering the facts of the 
Martin Marietta case and demonstrating how courts using the competing 
traditional and contextual approaches to contract interpretation would 
result in different outcomes. In this test suite, this Note intends to show 
how the contextualist approach creates a result that is more in line with 
the intent of the parties. 
The modified facts are as follows: Martin Marietta and Vulcan, in 
preliminary negotiations, decided to enter into confidentiality agreements 
while evaluating whether to effectuate a merger. Contemporaneously, 
Nye, Martin Marietta’s CEO, insisted on a separate standstill agreement 
with a term of two years. Vulcan resisted this arrangement but eventually 
agreed, and the executed standstill agreement provided that neither 
party would try to buy the other on an unsolicited basis, buy each others’ 
securities in the open market, or make an otherwise hostile offer to buy 
the other company until the standstill agreement expired in two years. 
The language used in the confidentiality agreements—the NDA and 
the JDA—was boilerplate, taken from the form of an earlier 
confidentiality agreement between the two companies. The final NDA 
and JDA were consistent, defining “Transaction” as “a possible business 
combination transaction between Martin Marietta and Vulcan or one of 
their respective subsidiaries.” The agreements provided that the 
confidential material was to be used “solely for the purpose of evaluating 
a Transaction.” 
The disclosure restrictions stated that the fact of the negotiations as 
well as the confidential material could not be disclosed unless legally 
required. This exception was not made explicitly subject to the following 
section, entitled “Required Disclosures,” which established a notice and 
vetting process in which requests for information from an external 
demand, such as a subpoena or civil investigation, must be forwarded to 
the other party and receive approval. The NDA had a term of five years 
and the JDA had an indefinite term. The agreements provided that 
money damages would not be a proper remedy for a breach and the non-
breaching party would be entitled to equitable relief for a breach. 
 152. Major law firms have alerted clients that confidentiality agreements “will likely be more 
heavily negotiated in light of recent decisions,” to “beware of unintended consequences when entering 
into [confidentiality agreements],” and that “slight variances in defined terms[] could significantly 
impact your bargained-for protections.” Jordan et al., supra note 147. 
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Merger negotiations between Martin Marietta and Vulcan soured, 
and a friendly merger agreement was never reached. Two years later, 
once the standstill agreement expired, Vulcan decided to launch a tender 
offer to Martin Marietta’s shareholders and filed a Schedule TO with the 
SEC. In Item 5 of the Schedule TO, Vulcan disclosed the fact that it had 
been in negotiations with Martin Marietta regarding a potential merger, 
and that it had signed the confidentiality agreements. Vulcan also filed a 
Confidential Treatment Request under Rule 24-b, marking the relevant 
pages of the Item 5 disclosures with a request for confidential treatment. 
The SEC granted confidential treatment of the information for the 
remainder of the agreements’ term. 
Martin Marietta, in an attempt to block the hostile bid, sues Vulcan 
for breach of the NDA and the JDA, claiming that under the terms of the 
agreements: (1) Vulcan was not permitted to use confidential information 
other than for evaluation of a consensual, negotiated deal; (2) even if it 
were permitted to use the information in evaluating whether to launch a 
hostile bid or is found to have decided to launch its bid without considering 
confidential information, it breached the disclosure restrictions by makings 
its disclosures to the SEC; and (3) even if the disclosures fit within the 
exception for “legally required” disclosures, it failed to conform to the 
notice and vetting process. 
This Note now turns to the traditionalist and contextual approaches 
to examine how courts using each approach would differ in their outcome 
in resolving this hypothetical case. 
A. Traditionalist Approach 
Under the traditionalist approach adopted by the Canadian court in 
Certicom, the definition of “transaction” unambiguously limits the use of 
confidential information to a contractual, negotiated deal between 
Vulcan and Martin Marietta.153 The use of the word “between” means 
that the parties cannot use the information or disclose the negotiations 
unless in the context of a negotiated deal. Therefore, if the court found 
that Vulcan had used any confidential information to form its hostile bid, 
it would have breached the confidentiality agreements, even though the 
standstill agreement had expired. 
Furthermore, under the Delaware Supreme Court’s reading, the plain 
language of the agreements prohibits disclosures to anyone, including the 
SEC, unless in response to an external demand.154 The line-item disclosures 
required by the SEC, which included the fact that the negotiations had 
taken place, were not in response to an external demand.155 Accordingly, 
153. See Certicom, 94 O.R. 3d 511, at para. 52–53. 
154. See Martin Marietta II, 68 A.3d 1208, 1226 (Del. 2012). 
155. See id. 
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Vulcan breached the agreements when it made these disclosures to the 
SEC, even though Vulcan requested that the information remain 
confidential under Rule 24b-2 and the SEC did not release the 
information to the public.156 The court would find that Vulcan also failed 
to conform to the notice and vetting process. 
Thus, under this approach, a court would find, without any further 
inquiry into the intent of the parties, that Vulcan breached the agreements 
when it launched its tender offer and made disclosures to the SEC. Similar 
to the remedy issued in Martin Marietta, the court would consider 
equitable relief, finding that, in the plain terms of the agreement, the 
parties stipulated that any breach constituted irreparable harm. The 
court would issue an injunction, prohibiting Vulcan from going forward 
with its hostile bid,157 and Martin Marietta’s current board would receive 
the benefit of a standstill it did not negotiate. 
B. Contextualist Approach 
Under the contextualist approach, the court would interpret the 
meaning of the agreements in light of all the circumstances.158 Thus, the 
court could consider the fact that the parties used boilerplate language 
that did not necessarily put any emphasis on the words “between” and 
“legally required,” and the fact that a separate standstill provision had 
been negotiated. Vulcan could proffer evidence that its CEO was 
reluctant to agree to a standstill, but eventually did because he expected 
that the restrictions would expire in two years, a shorter time period than 
the confidentiality agreements. 
Even if the court believed that the agreement’s language was 
unambiguous on its face, it would consider the extrinsic evidence 
explaining Vulcan’s reasonable reading of the terms, which would be 
found to be in line with the parties’ intent.159 The court would likely find 
that the parties did not intend to create a backdoor standstill agreement 
from the boilerplate terms of the confidentiality agreements, especially 
because the parties negotiated a separate standstill agreement. 
C. The Contextualist Approach is More in Line with the Parties’ 
Intent 
In such a case where the terms are similar but the history of the 
negotiations and the conduct behind the alleged breach are so different, 
156. See id. 
 157. The minimum period of repose, as in Martin Marietta, would be about three years—the time 
between when the hostile bid was launched and the expiration of the Nondisclosure Agreement. If the 
court chose to enforce specific performance for the Joint Defense Agreement because it had an 
indefinite term, Vulcan would be permanently enjoined from launching its hostile bid. 
158. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968).  
159. See Wolf v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649, 655–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
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it is apparent that constraining the courts to the plain language of the 
contract may produce unintended results. In the hypothetical in this Note, 
both parties arguably understood that only the standstill agreement 
prohibited the parties from launching a hostile bid. The parties negotiated 
these standard confidentiality agreements early on and, as is standard 
practice for M&A lawyers, the protections of the standstill agreement 
were separately negotiated.160 Neither party had negotiated the 
confidentiality agreements to have the effect of a standstill agreement. If 
they had, the standstill agreement they signed would have no purpose. 
Refusing to look outside the plain language of the document creates 
a contradiction between the intent of the parties and the words on the 
page. It is inconsistent to have an agreement that creates a backdoor 
standstill if there was no negotiated standstill provision, or a negotiated 
standstill provision with a different term, as in Certicom and the 
hypothetical case. This discrepancy cannot be reconciled by simply 
declaring, as Certicom and the Delaware Supreme Court in Martin 
Marietta do, that the words “between” or “legally required” are all it 
takes to make a standstill last as long as the term of the confidentiality 
agreement. Putting the force of entire agreements into a few words is 
unsatisfying to the parties and frustrates the purpose of confidentiality 
agreements and the practical circumstances in which they are usually 
drafted. 
Even courts adopting the traditionalist approach should take into 
consideration the practical effects of the language in determining 
whether there is ambiguity. Even under the traditionalist approach, the 
role of the court is to uphold the intent of the parties.161 The Delaware 
Court of Chancery in Martin Marietta read an ambiguity into the terms of 
the confidentiality agreements, thus allowing extrinsic evidence to 
interpret the contract. Courts in traditionalist jurisdictions that adopt a 
more lenient reading, such as the Court of Chancery, will allow more 
evidence of the parties’ intent to shape their interpretations and thus are 
more likely enforce contracts as the parties themselves intended. 
Conclusion 
Merger negotiations create the need to exchange confidential 
information. To protect this information from misuse and unwanted 
disclosure, parties to a merger negotiation, if well advised, always enter 
into confidentiality agreements. Practitioners also often negotiate for 
separate standstill agreements, precluding the parties from launching a 
hostile bid. 
160. See Climan et al., supra note 14, at 641–642. 
161. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 739 (2005). 
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The recent decisions in Certicom and Martin Marietta blurred the line 
between confidentiality agreements and standstills and, through their 
interpretation and enforcement of confidentiality agreements and their 
injunctive remedies, have created separate standstill agreements out of the 
words “between” and “legally required.” Examining the competing 
approaches to contractual interpretation illuminates the need for extrinsic 
evidence of the intent of the parties to evaluate whether these “backdoor” 
standstills were intended. The traditionalist approach, allowing a court to 
interpret the contract’s language by its understanding of “plain meaning,” 
can create unwanted results. The contextualist approach allows for a 
greater understanding of the actual intent of the parties to determine 
whether certain words were intended to carry as much weight as these 
courts have recently placed upon them. 
